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Polish original of Twardowski’s paper “O tak zwanych prawdach względnych”
(On so-called Relative Truths) appeared in 1900. Its German, slightly changed, ver-
sion “Über sogenannte relative Wahrheiten” was published in Archiv für systema-
tische Philosophie VIII(1902).1 Although Archiv was a leading German-language
philosophical journal, Twardowski’s paper did not elicit a special international reso-
nance. On the other hand, the earlier work (1900) certainly became one the most im-
portant philosophical papers in the history of Polish philosophy, particularly in the
Lvov-Warsaw School. For example, Twardowski’s main arguments against truth-
relativism (I will speak about absolutism and relativism instead truth-absolutism and
truth-relativism, unless another understanding in explicitly indicated) were repeated
by Tadeusz Kotabiński in his extremely influential textbook Elements of Theory of
Knowledge, Formal Logic and Methodology of Science, published in 1929.2 Izydora
Dąmbska used Twardowski’s arguments in her discussion whether conventionalism
implies relativism (her answer was “not”)3. In general, most members of the Lvov-
Warsaw School shared absolutism. This was very strongly stressed by Stanisław
Leśniewski in one of his earlier papers:
                                                
1 Repr. in Logischer Rationalismus. Philosophische Schriften der Lemberg-Warschauer Schule,
hrs. von D. Pearce and J. Woleński, Athenäum, Franfurt a. M. 1988, pp. 38-58.
2 For English translation, see T. Kotarbiński, Gnosiology. The Scientific Approach to the Theory
of Knowledge, Formal Logic and the Methodology of Sciences, Pergamon Press, Oxford 1966; see
pp. 109-113 for Kotarbiński’s discussion of truth-relativism.
3 I. Dąmbska, „Konwencjonalizm a relatywizm” (Conventionalism and Relativism), Kwartalnik
Filozoficzny 15(1938), pp. 328-337; Eng. trans. “Conventionalism vs. Relativism” 41(2008), pp. 9-16.
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No truth can be created! The need to stress and energetically instill this view in others is grow-
ing now that, at the present stage of development of Polish ‘philosophy’, voices claiming that
truths are created are claiming ever more loudly. It is not only the protagonists of all sorts of
‘Pragmatism”, Humanism’, ‘Conventionalism’, ‘Instrumentalism’, ‘previdionism’, etc. that
speak of the ‘creation of truths’, i. e. not only the representatives of these ‘philosophical’ trends
according to whom a judgment ‘becomes’ true : if it is useful for the preservation of the species;
if it assists in predicting reality, etc. That is not only those for whom, like for the Greek sophist
Protagoras and the Polish sophist Florian Znaniecki, ‘man is the measure of all things’ and thus
a ‘measure’ of truth. Slowly, truths begin to become ‘created’ even by the representatives of that
camp which is gathered at the Lvov University around Professor Kazimierz Twardowski, that
is, the camp who members have for such a long time believed that a judgment is always , ab-
solutely true, i. e. that it is independently of whether it is useful or damaging; whether it helps
to forecast the future or not; whether a scholar felt like ‘creating’ the given truth and he did, or
refrained from such ‘creation’, etc. No truth can be created!4
Leśniewski alluded in this passage to Kotarbiński, who accepted relativism with re-
spect to (using contemporary terminology) future contingents in his earlier writings,
but changed his views later, presumably under Leśniewski’s influence.
Susan Haack’s comments about Twardowski’s criticism of relativism are, at least
up to my knowledge, the first reaction in the English-speaking world. Haack raises
two issues. Firstly, she points out some defects in Twardowski’s arguments, and, sec-
ondly, she develops a broader relativist philosophical position, more general, not
only concerned the concept of truth. Certainly, Twardowski’s picture of relativism
was rather narrow. In fact, we did not know exactly who was counted as a relativist
by him. Twardowski explicitly refers only to Spencer and his idea that all knowledge
is relative and perhaps he also considered Nietzsche as an relativist. Yet it is fairly
unclear whether Twardowski was conscious of relativism of James, when he pre-
pared his paper (even in 1902). The quoted passage of Leśniewski’s offers a much
wider scenario of relativism, probably shared by the Twardowski’s circle about 1913
(the year of Leśniewski’s paper); Twardowski himself considered James as a relativ-
ist in his lectures in epistemology delivered in 1924/19255. However, standard argu-
ments of Twardowski and his students against truth-relativism did not change very
much after 1900; in particular, sentences with temporal indexicals were always used
as typical examples of relative truths in works of Polish philosophers. Consequently,
                                                
4 S. Leśniewski, „Is All Truth Only True Eternally or It Is also True without a Beginning”, in S.
Leśniewski, Collected Works, ed. by S. J. Surma, J. T. Srzednicki, D. I. Barnett and V. F. Rickey, v.
I, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht 1992, p. 104 (tr. by S. J. Surma and J. Wójcik); Polish
original appeared in 1913.
5 K. Twardowski, „Theory of Knowledge. A Lecture Course”, in K. Twardowski, On Actions
Products and Other Topics in Philosophy, ed. by J. Brandl and J. Woleński, trans. by A. Szylewicz,
Rodopi, Amsterdam 1999, pp. 181-239. James’ views on truth are analyzed on pp. 222-239, that is,
quite extensively. It is known that Twardowski’s lectured on epistemological topics in 1917/1918
(and earlier), but there is no documentation that he commented James in his earlier courses.
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we cannot consider them as straightforwardly applicable to any advanced pragma-
tism. Haack concludes at the end of her comments:
[…] the point with which I will conclude for now is that, though an adequate epistemology
does indeed require a robust conception of truth, what “robust” means here is simply “not-
relativist”.
This conclusion suggests that the question whether truth is relative or absolute re-
quires a new setting in epistemology and cannot be reduced to Twardowski’s argu-
ments, in particular, to his understanding of relativism as “a single, simple thesis, the
thesis that there are relative truths”, because truth is considered as “relative to com-
munity, theory, culture, etc.”. It would be difficult to do not agree with Haack at this
point. Certainly, contemporary relativism is a more complex philosophical theory as
compared with its account proposed by Polish philosophers, almost entirely gener-
ated by Twardowski’s paper.
Since my remarks are not intended to a (even) modest realization of the enter-
prise indicated above as an attempt to discuss “a robust conception of truth” as suit-
able for contemporary epistemology, I pass to Haack’s comments about Twar-
dowski’s way in order to refute relativism. At first, I consider Haack’s opinion that
he [Twardowski] never actually gives any explicit argument that there are no relative truths; the
only arguments he makes explicitly are to the effect that no judgments are relatively true”.
My assessment is exactly contrary. Twardowski notes very clearly at the very begin-
ning of his paper how he understand some crucial phrases. He writes (p. 147):6
The term “a truth” designates a true judgment. Therefore, all judgments that are true, that pos-
sess the characteristic of truthfulness, are truths. Hence, it is always possible to use the expres-
sion “a true judgment” instead of the term “a truth”. If then follows that the expressions
“relative truth” and “absolute truth” mean the same as the expressions “relatively true judg-
ment” and “absolutely true judgment”.
A simple replacement of “relatively true” by a “a relative truth” in “A is relatively
true” gives “A is a relative truth”. Hence, if one asserts that “no judgments are rela-
tive true”, he or she can equivalently express this statement by “there are no relative
truths”. Haack seems to strengthen her position by observing that the title of Twar-
dowski’s paper uses plural “Truths”, but not singular “Truth”. However, neglecting
Twardowki’s quoted explanations, one can maintain that “So-Called” functions as a
modifier. Consequently, so-called relative truths are not truths at all.
Clearly, my last remark pertains rather formal or conventional matters than sub-
stantial ones. In fact, the assumed equivalence of “relatively true” and “a relative
truth” does not seem very important for the issue whether there are relative truths or
                                                
6 All references to Twardowski’s paper are to its English translation in K. Twardowski, “On So-
called Relative Truths”, in K. Twardowski, On Actions Products and Other Topics in Philosophy,
ed. by J. Brandl and J. Woleński, trans. by A. Szylewicz, Rodopi, Amsterdam 1999, pp. 147-149.
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not. And Haack advances some further arguments which are intended to point out
essential difficulties in Twardowski’s view. First of all, there is a question of truth-
bearers. In Polish text, Twardowski distinguishes sądy and powiedzenia. Although
we can translate the latter by “statements” or “sentences”, it remains unclear how to
understand the former, rendered as judgments. Twardowski explained that judgments
are mental products of judging as an activity. In the subsequent Polish philosophical
language it was customary to distinguish sądy w sensie psychologicznym and sądy w
sensie logicznym, that is, expressions eventually translated by “propositions in the
psychological sense” and “propositions in the logical sense”; we can also render sądy
w sensie psychologicznym by “judgments”. Now, a more contemporary exposition of
Twardowski’s arguments could be as follows. Statements (sentences) express propo-
sitions (in the logical sense) as genuine bearers of truth. Since some statements are
elliptical, for example, when they contain indexicals or vague terms, the same state-
ment can express different propositions. Thus, an apparent reason to maintain that
there are relative truths consists in confusing statements with propositions. Briefly
speaking, only (some) statements apparently look as relatively true, because they are
incomplete, but propositions are always complete and thereby either absolutely true
or absolutely false. Since propositions are proper (genuine) truth-bearers, there are
no relative truths, but so-called relative-truths; this reasoning exactly shows why “so-
called” functions as a modifier. However, as Haack persuasively argues, there is no
other way to individuate propositions than by using corresponding statements
(sentences). Consequently, the latter seem basic units not only for individuate of
propositions but also for assessing whether a given proposition, expressed by a given
statement, is complete or completeable at all. An additional difficulty related to the
discussed problem is suggested by Haack’s considerations in her paper “The Whole
Truth and Nothing but the Truth” (reprinted in this volume). If we accept that ellipti-
cal factors of language are impossible to fully eliminate them, any chance to extract
complete propositions from elliptical statements becomes illusory. This is the main
problem for the view that propositions are truth-bearers and it blames all truth-
theories based on this assumption, not only Twardowski’s account.7 I consider the
reported analysis of Haack as great achievement in analytic philosophy.
How to meet this difficulty? My suggestion is as follows. The first step consists
in adopting Tarski’s view (in fact, anticipated by Leśniewski and Łukasiewicz) that
sentences interpreted as linguistic unit having meaning by definition, are truth-
bearers. Secondly, we consider elliptical sentences as open formulas. For example,
the sentence “it is raining now” is understood as “it is raining at t”, where t is a tem-
poral variable; another possibility is to treat “now” as a parameter. Thus, we have a
strict parallelism:
                                                
7 Haack’s own theoretical perspective is based on accepting that statements are truth-bearers
and introducing the concept of partial truth, but I do not enter into this question.
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Twardowski’s statements —————————— open formulas
Twardowski’s judgments (propositions) ————  sentences (closed formulas).
Furthermore, open formulas can be relatively true, depending of fixing the value of t,
but sentences are true or false in the absolute sense. This strategy solves one part of
the problem, but its full success depend on the verdict whether indexical (elliptical)
features of language can be eliminated. I guess that it is always possible and done
much more frequently that it appears for the first sight. Take vagueness and consider
an utterance “a is coming to age”, for example. This sentence does not cause diffi-
culties in many situations, but it is always possible to introduce a regulative defini-
tion stipulating, for instance, that such and such age results with coming to age. Such
definitions are indispensable in law, because coming to age causes very important
facts as, for instance, being eligible for legal responsibility, penal and civil as well.
Anyway, the outlined proposal makes possible to rephrase Twardowski’s arguments
without any recurrence to judgments or propositions.
Maria Kokoszyńska defended Twardowski’s arguments against relativism by ob-
serving that the predicate “is true” is incomplete.8 It can be make complete by in-
voking some circumstances. More specifically, she offers the following explanation:
(#) a sentence A is relatively true, if it is true accordingly to circumstances C
and not-A is true with respect to circumstances C’, provided that C ≠ C’.
If the stipulation (#) is accepted, we have to do with proper relativism, which can be
radical (the relativity concerns all sentences) or moderate (the relativity is restricted
to some sentences). On the other hand, improper relativism admits truth (falsity) in
some possible world and its negation in another possible world; clearly, C and C’
mentioned in (#) occur in the same possible world. According to Kokoszyńska,
Twardowski criticized proper relativism and his criticism applies to its radical as well
as moderate version. Moreover, she qualified Tarski’s semantic conception as abso-
lute in her sense. In fact, Kokoszyńska suggested that absoluteness is the most dis-
tinctive feature of the classical (Aristotelian) theory of truth; she even spoke about its
identification with the view that truth is absolute and it is interesting that the idea of
correspondence is not relevant in this account.
Let me return to Twardowski’s criticism. One of his arguments says (p. 161/162)
that the relativist (more precisely, the subjective relativist, but I neglect this issue
here) does not recognize the principle of contradiction and the principle of excluded
middle as the fundamental modes of formal-logical reasoning. However, Twar-
                                                
8 See M. Kokoszyńska, “Über den absoluten Wahrheitsbegriff und einige andere semantische
Begriffe”, Erkenntnis 6(1936), pp. (repr. in Logischer Rationalismus. Philosophische Schriften der
Lemberg-Warschauer Schule, hrs. von D. Pearce and J. Woleński, Athenäum, Frankfurt a. M. 1988,
pp. 276-292), M. Kokoszyńska, “What Means a “Relativity” of Truth”, Studia Philosophica
III(1948), pp. 167-175, M. Kokoszyńska, “A Refutation of the Relativity of Truth”, Studia Phi-
losophica IV(1951), pp. 93-149.
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dowski’s reasoning should be made much more precise. First of all, we should speak
about metalogical versions of both principles (Twardowski had no distinction of
logic and metalogic). Secondly and more importantly, the relation of a truth-
definition to both principles must be explicitly stated. Let the symbols TD, CN and
EM refer to a truth-definition, the principle of contradiction and the principle of ex-
cluded middle, respectively. Not-recognizing of CN and EM can be rendered in two
ways:
(*) TD d ¬CN (or ¬EM);
(**) ¬(TD d (CN ∨ EM)).
Twardowski attributed (*) to relativists, because he explicitly said that the relativist
denies CN. This is the view qualified as proper relativism by Kokoszyńska. It is dis-
putable whether (**) implies relativism at all. Since the conjunction of CN and EM
expresses the principle of bivalence, one can rephrase the problem by asking whether
bivalence is a necessary condition of absolutism. Take Łukasiewicz’s 3-valued logic
as an experimentum crucis. The bivalence is rejected in this system. Although Łu-
kasiewicz never discussed the absolutism/relativism problem, it seems that he shared
the former view. In particular, he apparently identified absolutism with the eternality
of truth (what is true remains true for ever). Leśniewski (and Twardowski as well)
was more demanding and required that absolute truth is eternal as well as sempiter-
nal (what is true, was always true). This shows that temporal indexing of logical val-
ues has far-reaching consequences for the philosophy of truth. Let me incidentally
adds that Leśniewski (in the paper quoted in note 4) formally proved that eternality
and sempiternality are equivalent modulo CN. This result seems to have very far-
reaching consequences for the philosophy of truth, determinism and indeterminism,
but I must leave this question without further comments.
The semantic definition of truth implies the principle of bivalence. Hence, it
seems to be absolute. However, the issue is not so simple.9 One can ask which of
Tarski’s definitions, that formulated in 1933 and relating the truth-predicate to a lan-
guage L or that formulated in 1957 defining truth-in-a-model M. Haack takes into
account the former one and, if I correctly understand her, considers it as neutral with
respect to the absolutism/relativism controversy. In my view, the concept of truth-in-
a-model is a refinement of Tarski’s earlier notion. If we assume, as Tarski did, that
semantics concerns interpreted languages, every interpretation generated a model and
every model is associated with an interpretation. Since bivalence is entailed by the
definition of the truth-in-a-model, Tarski’s concept of true is absolute on all stan-
dards. If we say that semantic truth is relative to a model, this relativism is improper
in Kokokoszyńska’s sense. This brief discussion shows a philosophical importance
                                                
9 See J. Woleński “Is Tarski's Conception of Truth Relativistic?”, w: 60 Years of Tarski's Defi-
nition of Truth, ed. by B. Twardowski and J. Woleński, Philed, Krakow 1994, pp. 96-112 for a more
extensive discussion of this matter.
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of Kokoszyńska’s distinction and Tarski’s construction. Kokoszyńska directly and
Tarski indirectly continued the line of thinking about truth originated in Twar-
dowski’s paper. Still one view of Haack should be mentioned. She is inclined to ap-
ply Tarski’s definition to regimented languages only. I am more optimistic about ap-
plications of formal semantics to natural language and philosophy.10 Thus, if this
conviction is correct, the problem of whether ordinary truth is absolute or relative
can be profitably analyzed by strict logical tools.
                                                
10 See J. Woleński, “Semantic Conception of Truth as a Philosophical Theory”, in The Nature of
Truth (If Any), ed. by J. Peregrin, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht 1999, pp. 51-66;
